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Abstract
The rapid growth of the Internet facilitates the outsourcing of certai.n computations, in the
following sense: A customer who needs these computations done on some data but lacks the
computational resources (or programming expertise) to do so, can use an external agent to
perform these computations. This currently arises in many practical situations, including the
financial services and petroleum services industries. The outsourcing is secure if it is done
without revealing to the agent either the actual data or the actual answer to the computation.
In this paper we describe how representative operations matrix multiplication, matrix inversion,
solution of a linear system of equations, convolution, and sorting can be securely outsourced in
a practical sense.
The general idea is for the customer to do some carefully designed local preprocessing of the
data before sending it to the agent, and also some local postprocessing of the answer returned
by the agent to extract from it the true answer. The pre- and postprocessing should not take
time more than proportional to the size of the input, which is unavoidable because the customer
must at least read the input once. The purpose of the preprocessing step that the customer
performs locally is to "hide" the real data with suitably chosen noise, sending to the agent the
obfuscated data. The purpose of the postprocessing is to extract from the noisy answer returned
by the agent the true answer that the customer seeks.




Outsourcing is a. general procedure employed in the business world when one entity, the customer
C, chooses to farm out (outsource) a certain task to an external entity, the agent A. The reasons
for the customer to Qutsource the task to the agent could be many, ranging from a lack of resources
to perform the task locally to a deliberate choice made for fInancial rea.<>ons (it could be cheaper
to outsource). Here we consider the outsourcing of certain kinds of computations, with the added
twist that the data and the answers sought are to be hidden from the agent who is performing the
computations on the customer's behalf. That is, the customer's information (both the data and
the results obtained) is proprietary, and it is either the customer who does not wish to trust the
agent with preserving the secrecy of that information, or it is the agent who insists on the secrecy
so as to protect itself from liability because of accidental or malicious (e.g., by a bad employee)
disclosure of the confidential data.
The current practice is that such outsourcing of sensitive and higWy valuable proprietary data
is commonly done "in the clear," that is, by revealing both data and results to the agent hired
to perform the computation. One industry where this happens is the financial services 'mdustry,
where the proprietary data includes the customer's projections of the likely future evolution of
certain commodity prices, interest and inflation rates, economic statistics, portfolio holdings, etc.
Another industry is the energy services industry, where the proprietary data is mostly seismic, and
can be used to estimate the likelihood of finding oil or gas if one were to drill at the geographic spot
in question. The seismic data is so massive that doing multiplication and inversion of such large
matrices of data is beyond the computational resources of even the major oil service companies,
which routinely outsource these computations to a number of supercomputing centers.
In this paper we propose various schemes for outsourcing to an outside agent a suitably-modified
version of the input data, in a way that hides the data from the agent and yet has the property
that the anSwers returned by the agent can easily be used to obtain the true answer - the one
corresponding to the true input data. The local computations take time proportional to the size of
the input, and the schemes we propose appear to work well experimentally, both from the point of
view of data-hiding and from the point of view of numerical stability.
The framework of this paper differs from what is found in the cryptography literature concern-
ing this kind of problem. Secure outsourcing in the sense of [2J follows an information-theoretic
approach, leading to elegant negative results about the impossibility of securely outsourcing compu-
tationally intractable problems. In addition, the cryptographic protocols literature contains much
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that is reminescent of the framework of the present paper, w1th many elegant protocols for co-
operatively computing functions without revealing information about the functions' arguments to
the other party (cr. the many references in, for example, [13, 11]). In tills paper's framework,
the encryption methods we use cannot have the usual desirable cryptographic properties, because
they would then "manglell the data too much, making the answers returned by the agent to the
customer useless. Instead, we hide the real data by using operations that are "gentle" enough to
allow recovery of the real answer from what the agent computes. Our methods are geared towards
the numerical problems we consider, all of which are solvable in polynomial time - but in our
framework even "polynomial time" computation by the customer is too expensive if it is not linear
in the size of the input. We thus require that the local computations done by the customer should
be as light as possible, i.e., should take time that is proportional to the size of the input (which
is unavoidable because the customer must at least read the input once). The time taken by the
agent should not simply be polynomial: It should be proportional to the time it would have taken
to solve the problem locally (i.e., without outsourcing). We believe that for the problems consid-
ered, and compared to the current practice, our proposed schemes are a substantial improvement.
The experimental data from our "proof of concept" software implementation seems to confirm the
practical viability of our methods.
Finally, our approach also differs from the prmacy homomorphism approach that has been
proposed in the past [10]. The framework of the latter assumes that the outsourcing agent is
used as a permanent repository of the data, performlng certain operations on it and maintaining
certain predicates, whereas the customer needs only to decrypt the data from the external agent's
repository t.o obtain from it the real data. Our framework is different in the following ways:
• The customer is not interested in keeping data permanently with the outsourcing agent;
instead, the customer only wants to use temporarily its superior computational resources.
• The customer has some local computing power that is not limited to encryption and decryp-
tion. However, this local computing power is far less than that of the outsourcing agent. For
example, if the problem domain has to do with n X n matrices, then we shall typically assume
that the customer can afford to perform locally computations that take time proportional to
n2 but not u3 , whereas the outsourcing agent has the resources to perform n3 operations (and
thus can invert such matrices, multiply them, etc).
Whatever information I the agent A obtains from customer C during the course of the out-
sourciug procedure, it is desirable for I to satifsy some conditions that make it impractical for A
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to use I to determine certain things about the real numerical data (that only C should know). We
discuss these conditions next.
• Requirement 1: There are infinitelyl many possible sets of data that are consistent with I,
all but one of which are different from the real data. For example, if the data is an n X n
matrix, then there should be infinitely many matrices that are consistent with I.
Note, however, that Requirement 1 is not enough as it leaves open the possibility of compro-
mising a subset of the data, e.g., a particular entry of the input matrix. This is remedied by the
next requirement.
• Requirement 2: Same as the above Requirement 1 except that it must also hold for any
non-empty subset of the data. That is, for any non-empty subset S of the real data, there
are infinitely many possible choices for S that are consistent with I.
Requirement 2 is an improvement over the previous one, but it still leaves room for compromising
the ratio between two particular real data items. For example, multiplying a matrix by a secret
scalar number and sending the resulting matrix to the agent A can hardly be said to hide the
matrix, because A can learn the ratio between two particular entries of the original matrix. The
next requirement remedies this.
• Requirement 3: Same as Requirement 2, plus the following additional requirement. For any
ordered subset S=(al,' . " ak) of the real data values in which every ai+l equals f( ai) for some
function f, I does not reveal that functional relationship between the successive elements of
S. As special cases, this requires that I not reveal
the ratio between any two particular values of the real data (e.g., no ratio between two
particular input or output matrix entries should be revealed), or
the fact that the ai'S are in some regular (e.g., arithmetic, or geometric) progression.
Our schemes will satisfy Requirement 3. They will also satisfy additional conditions, summa-
rized below.
• Requirement 4: Same as Requirement 3, plus the additional requirement that, for any non-
empty subset S of the real data and any function 9 E { Mean, Median, Mode, Standard Deviation
1lLlnfinitely" is used here loosely, in that it assumes a computer capable of real arithmetic; although in practice
computers have a finite total number of states, that number is so huge that in practice it can be considered "infinite."
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}, 'L does not reveal g(8) to A. This implies, for example, that if the data is an n X n matrix,
then we should not only hide the individual matrix entries and the ratios between any two
such entries, but also such quantities M the sum of all n2 entries (in fact we shall give below an
example of how one could inadvertently reveal such a quantity by a careless use of probability
distributions during the "hiding" process).
The matrix and vector operations we consider here should be viewed as base computations, ones
that make possible the secure outsourcing of a wide variety of computations that can be decomposed
into a sequence of base computations (there are too many such decomposable problems to enumerate
here).
Throughout what follows we use random numbers, random matrices, random permutations, etc.;
it is always Msumed that each is generated independently of the others, and that quality random
number generation is used (cf. [6, Chap. 23], [12, [Chap. 12]' [5, 9, 4]). It is not assumed that they
are generated from a uniform distribution, or in fact from any particular fixed distribution. Indeed,
for increMed security, the exact form of the distribution used would itself be a variable, in the
sense that the customer would have a catalog of distributions and would switch from using one to
using another, to prevent the external agent A from knowing even the probabilistic characteristics
of what C is sending. For example, when generating a large random vector S, the various entries
of S should be generated from different distributions in C's catalog of available distributions. If
all the n entries of S were generated uniformly in some interval centered at zero, then S would not
do a good job of "hiding" another (secret) vector V that it is added to; to see this, simply observe
that, in such a case, the sum of the n entries of V + S would be very close to the sum of the n
entries of V, thus partially compromising the composition of V.
In sections 2-6 we present our schemes for important computations that can be securely out-
sourced. These are matrix multiplication, matrix inversion, solution of a linear system of equations,
convolution and sorting. We included sorting for theoretical rather than practical interest - we
are not aware of anyone who outsources sorting. We do know that the major oil services companies
outsource matrix operations and convolutions (it is somewhat surprising to see convolution there,
because O(nlogn) computation time is not that expensive, whereas the O(n3 ) computation time
used by the matrix operations makes them exorbitantly expensive for large n). In each of the
sections 2-6, we describe schemes of increasing complexity, starting each section with schemes that
make no attempt at hiding the problem's dimension n, and ending it with a description of the
modifications needed to h.ide n.
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We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic mathematical objects mentioned below.
For a review of the definitions of matrix product, matrix inversion, and their properties, we refer the
reader to [8] (which contains many other references). For a review of convolution and its properties,
we refer the reader to [1].
2 Matrix Multiplication
Assume that C wants to outsource the computation of the product of two n x n matrices M t and
M 2 • (At the end of this sectlon we explain how essentially the same method works for non-square
matrices.)
Notation 1 We use 6x,y to denote the function that equals 1 if x = y and 0 if xi y (the so-called
"Kronecker delta" function).
2.1 A Preliminary Solution
The followlng is a preliminary algorithm for performing matrix multiplication using an external
agent. It satisfies the requirement that all local processing by C should Lake time proportional to
the size of the input, in this case O(n2 ).
1. C creates (1) three random permutations 1I"t, 11"2, and 113 of the integers {1, 2,'··, n}, and (ii)
three sets of non-zero random num bers {at, (X2, ••• , Qn}, {.8t ,.82, ... , .an}, and h't, /2, ... , /n}'
2. C creates matrices Pt, P2, and P3 where Pt(i,j) = Qi6"l(i),j, P2(i,j) = .8i61'02(i),j, and
P3(i,j) = /i6"3(;),j·











, is available to C in constant time.
3. C computes locally matrix
(2)
Observe that left-multiplying a matrix by Pt takes O(n2 ) time and amounts to permuting
its rows according to 1I"t and then multiplying each i-th resulting row by Ui. Also observe
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that right-multiplying a matrix by p;1 also takes O(n2) time and amounts to permuting its
columns according to 11"2 and then multiplying each j-th resulting column by (f3j)-I. Thus
(3)
4. C computes locally, in O(n 2 ) time, the matrix
(4)
5. C sends X and Y to A. A computes the product XY, which is
(5)
and sends Z to C.
6. C computes locally, in O(n2 ) time, the matrix Pl l ZP3, which equals M IM 2 •
This completes the algorithm.
The above method may be secure enough for many applications, as A would have to guess two
permutations (from the (n!)2 possible such choices) and 3n numbers (the ai, f3j, Ii) before it can
pin down M 1 or M 2 •
2.2 An Improved Solution
The following scheme is more elaborate and gives somewhat better security because, in addition
to left- and right-multiplying a matrix to be hidden by the sparse random matrices Pi or their
inverse, the resulting matrix is further hidden by adding a dense random matrix to it. Of course
the above-mentioned multiplication by a Pi matrix or its inverse needs to be done in O(n 2 ) time,
i.e., in time proportional to the size of the input matrices. The details follow_
1. C locally computes matrices X = PIMIF2-1 and Y = P2M2P3-1 as was done in the previous,
preliminary scheme.
2. C selects two random n x n matrices 51 and 52 (that is, matrices whose entries are random).
C also generates four random numbers 13, 1,13',I' such that
IT the above is violated then we discard the four random numbers chosen and we repeat
the random experiment of choosing a new set of numbersj observe, however, that there is
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zero probability that a random choice results in a violation of the above condition, hence
the random choice need not be repeated more than 0(1) times (in practice, once is usually
enough).
3. C computes locally the six matrices X + S}, Y + S2, fJX - 7S}, fJY - 7S2, fJ'X - 7/S},
fJ'Y -7'S2. Then C sends these six matrices to agent A.




(X +51 )(Y +5,)
(fJX - ,51 )(fJY - ,5,)




and sends the resulting matrices W, U, U' to C.
5. C computes locally matrices V and V/ where
v
v'
(fJ + ,)-l(U + fJ,W)
(fJ' +,')-l(U' + fJ','W).
(9)
(10)
6. C computes locally the matrix
wblch happens to equal XY (as can be easily verified - we leave the details to the reader).
7. C computes M}M2 from XY by computing
This completes the algorithm.
2.3 Non-square Matrices
We now turn our attention to the case when M} and M 2 are not square, Le., when M} is I x m
and M 2 is m x n and hence M1M 2 is I x n. Essentially the same method as above works in that
case, except that we have to carefully choose the sizes of the Pi and Si matrices. For the Si tbls is
straightforward: 51 must be l x m and 52 must be m x n, because each of them is added to matrices
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having such dimensions. But for the Pi we have a potential source of conflicting requirements: (i)
A Pi must be a square matrix (because we need to use its inverse - non-square matrices have no
inverse), (ii) the size of a Pi must be compatible with the number of rows of the matrices that it
(or its inverse) is left-multiplying, and (iii) the size of a Pi must be compatible with the number
of columns of the matrices that it (or its inverse) is right-multiplying. For example, as P2 is used
for left-multiplying M 2 , and M 2 has m rows, there is a requirement that P2 should be m x m.
Luckily, the requirement stemming from the fact that P2-
1 right-multiplies M 1 is compatible with
the previous one, because M 1 has m columns. This is not an accident, and it is easy to verify that
there are no conflicting requirements on the size of any of the Pi matrices that are used in the
algorithm, 1 ~ i ~ 3.
2.4 Hiding the Matrices' Dimensions
We briefly sketch how to hide the dimensions of the matrices Lo be multiplied. Let M1 be an a x b
matrix and M2 be a b x c matrix. The problem of multiplying these matrices is replaced by one (or
a small number) of multiplications of matrices whose dimensions ai, bl, c' are different from a, b, c
(the new matrices are handled by using the methods already developed in the previous subsections).
Hiding the dimensions can be done by either enlarging or shrinking one (or a combination of) the
three relevant dimensions: We say that we have "enlarged" a if a l > a, that we have "shrunk" a if
al < a (similarly for b' and c'). Although for convenience we shall explain how to enlarge/shrink a
separately from how to enlarge/shrink band c, it should be understood that these operations can
be done in many possible combinations (we give some examples below).
2.4.1 Enlarging the dimensions
Enlarging a (so that it becomes a' > a) is done by appending al-a additional rows, having random
entries, to the first matrix. Of course this causes the matrix product to have a' - a additional rows,
but these can be ignored.
Similarly, enlarging c (so that it becomes c' > c) is done by appending c'-c additional columns,
having random entries, to the second matrix. Of course this causes the matrix product to have
c' - c additional columns, but these can be ignored.
On the other hand, enlarging b involves changes to both matrices, by appending b' - b extra
columns to the first matrix and bl - b extra rows to the second matrix. Furthermore, these addi-
tional rows and columns cannot have' completely random entries because they would then interact
to corrupt the output: The output matrix has same dimensions after enlarging b as before - we
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need to make sure the output matrix is not changed by the enlargement of b. Thls is achieved
as follows: Number the b' - b extra columns 1,2,"', b' - h, and similarly number the extra rows
1,2, ... , b' - b. Choose the entries of the odd-numbered extra columns (respectively, rows) to be
random (respectively, zero), and choose the entries of the even-numbered extra columns (respec-
tively, rows) to be zero (respectively, random). Verify that enlarging b in this way causes no change
in the matrix product.
Of course the above three operations can be done in conjunction with each other: We would
then first apply the enlargement of b, then the enlargements of a and c.
2.4.2 Shrinking the dimensions
Shrinking a is done by partitioning the first matrix M 1 into two matrices: One Mf consisting of
the first a - a' rows, another M;' consisting of the last a
'
rows. The second matrix stays the same,
but to get the a X c matrix we seek we now have to perform hoth M{M2 and M{'M1 .
Similarly, shrinking c 1s done by partitioning the second matrix M 1 into two matrices: One
M~ consisting of the first c - c' columns, another Mr consisting of the last c' columns. The first
matrix stays the same, but to get the a x c matrix we seek we now have to perform both M1M{
and M1Mr.
Shrinking b is done by partitioning both matrices into two matrices. The first matrix M1 is
partitioned into an M{ consisting of the first b - b' columns, another Mr' consisting of the last b
'
columns. The second matrix M 1 is partitioned into an M~ consisting of the first b- b' rows, another
M~' consisting of the last b' rows. The a x c matrix we seek is then M{M~+ M{'M~'.
Doing all of the above three shrinking operations simultaneously results in a partition of each
of M 1 and M 1 into four matrices. If we denote by M1([i : j], [k : I]) the submatrix of M 1 whose
rows are in the interval [i,i] and whose columns are in the interval [k,l], then computing M1M1
requires the following four computations:
M, ([1 , a - a'], [1 , b - b'J)M,([1 , b - b'], [1 , c - c'D +
M,([I, a - a'],[b- b' +1, bDM,([b - b' + 1 ,b],[I' c - c'D,
M, ([1 , a - a'], [1' b - b'DM,([1 ,b - b'], [c - c' +1 , cD +
M, ([1 ,a - a'], [b - b' +1 ,bDM,([b - b' +1 , b], [c - c' +1 ,cD,
M,([a - a' +1 , a], [1' b- b'DM,([1 ,b - b'], [1, c - c'D +
M,([a - a' + 1 ,a], [b - b' + 1 , bDM,([b - b' + 1 , b], [1' c - c'D,
M,([a- a' + 1, a],[I' b- b'DM,([I, b- b'],[c- c' + 1, cJ) +
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M, ([a- a' +1, a],[b-b' + 1, bDM,([b-b' +1, b],[c- c' + 1 "D.
3 Matrix Inversion
Assume that C wants to Qutsource the inversion of the n X n matrix M. The scheme we describe
next uses secure matrix multiplication as a subroutine. It satisfies the requirement that all local
processing by C takes time proportional to the size of the input, in this case O(n2 ) time. We first
give, in the next subsection, a scheme that does not concern itself with hiding n.
3.1 Inversion Scheme
1. C selects a random n x n matrix S. The probability that S is non-invertible is small, but if
that is the case then Step 4 below will send us back to Step 1 and we will have to start over
with another random matrix S. This need only be repeated 0(1) times before S is invertible
(in practice, once is usually enough).
2. C outsources the computation of
(11)
using secure matrix multiplication. As before, we use A to denote the agent used. Of course
after this step A knows neither M 1 nor S, nor M.
3. C generates matrices PI, P2 , P3 , P4 , Ps using the same method as for the PI matrix in Steps
1 and 2 of the preliminary solution to matrix multiplication. That is, Pl(i,j) = ai0'll"I(i),j,
P2(i,j) = biO;r2(i),j, P3(i,j) = C;O'll"J(i),j, P4(i,j) = di0'll"4(i),j, and Ps(i,j) = ejO;rI;(i),j where 11"1>
1I"2,1I"3,1I"4,1I"S are random permutations, and where the ai, bi, Cj, dj, ej are random numbers.
Then C computes locally, in O(n2 ) time, the matrices
Q
R




4. C sends Q to agent A, who tries to compute Q-l and, if it succeeds, sends Q-l back to C.
IT it does not succeed then Q is not invertible, and hence at least one of S or M (possibly
both) is non-invertible. When A detects that Q is non-invertible then it lets C know, and C
then does the following:
(a) C tests whether S is invertible by first computing S = 818S2 where 8 1 and 8 2 are
matrices known by C to be invertible, and then sending S to A for the purpose of
11
inverting it.
Note: C is only interested in whether S is invertible or not, not in its actual inverse;
in fact C will discard S whether S is invertible or not. The fact that C will discard
S makes the choice of 8 1 and 8 2 less crucial than otherwise. Hence 81 and 82 can be
generated so they belong to a class of matrices known to be invertible, such as the Pi we
have been using (in such a case S can be computed by C locally, without outsourcing);
there are many other classes of matrices known to be invertible (d. [7,8]). It is unwise
to let 8 1 and 82 be the identity matrices, because by knowing 8 the agent A might learn
how we are generating these random matrices.
(b) IT A can invert S then C knows that 8 is invertible, hence that M is not invertible. If A
informs C that S is not invertible, then C knows that 8 is not invertible. In that case C
goes back to Step 1, i.e., chooses another S, etc. The number of time C has to go back
to Step 1 in this way is small (zero in practice) because of the high probability that a
randomly chosen 8 matrix is invertible.
5. C computes locally, in D(n2 ) time, the matrix
It is easily verified that T is equal to P48-1M-1PSI.
6. C outsources to agent A the computation of
Z=RT (14)
using secure matrix multiplication. Of course the random permutations and numbers used
within this secure matrix multiplication subroutine must be independently generated from
those of the above Step 3 (using those of Step 3 would compromise security).
Observe that
7. C computes locally in O(n2 ) time P3- 1 ZPs , which equals M- l •
The security of the above follows from
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1. the fact that the calculations of.!VI and Z are done using secure matrix multiplication, which
reveals neither the operands nor the results to agent 11, and
2. the judicious use of the matrices PI, .. " Ps for "isolating" from each other the three separate
computations that we outsource to A; such isolation is a good design principle whenever
repeated usage is made of the same agent, to make it difficult for that agent to correlate the
various subproblems it is solving (in this case three). Of course less care needs to be taken if
one is using more than one external agent (more on this later).
3.2 Hiding the Matrix Dimension
Hiding n is achieved by (i) using the dimension-hiding version of matrix multiplication in the
scheme of the previous section, and (ii) in Step 4, performing the inversion of Q by inverting a
small number of n' X n' matrices where n' differs from n.
If we wish to hide the dimension of Q in Step 4 by enlarging it (Le., n' > n), then we need only
modify Step 4 so that it inverts one n' X n' matrix Q' defined as follows, where 0' (respectively,
0") is an n X (n' - n) (respectively, (n' - n) X n) matrix all of whose entries are zero, and S' is an
(n' - n) x (n' - n) random invertible matrix:
Q'([1 : n], [1: nJ) ~ Q,
Q'([1 : n],[n +1: n'J) = 0',
Q'([n +1 : n'], [1: nJ) = 0",
Q'([n + 1 : n'], [n +1 : n'J) = S'.
Of course the inversion of Q' is not performed by sending it directly to the agent A as the zeroes in
it would reveal n. Rather, the inversion of Q is done by using the scheme of the previous subsection
(which does not worry about hiding dimensions - this is acceptable because the dimension of Q'
is different from the n that we seek to hide).
The case of shrinking dimension is more subtle, and relies on the following fact [1]: If X =
Q([1 : mJ, [1: mJ) i, inve,tible (m < n), Y = Q([m + 1 : nJ, [m + 1 : nJ), V = Q([1 : m], [m+ 1 : nJ),
W = Q([m+ 1: n],[1: m]), and D = Y - WX-1V is invertible, then
Q-l([l: m],[m+ 1: nJ) = _X-1VD-1,
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Q-l([m +1: n], [1: mJ) = _D-1WX-1,
Q-l([m + 1 : n], [m + 1 : nJ) = D- 1 •
The above suggests that the modified Step 4 would partition Q into four matrices X, Y, V, W,
then use the secure matrix multiplication scheme of the previous section (possibly with dimension-
hiding) and the inversion scheme of the previous subsection (possibly with dimension-enlargement)
to compute the four pieces of Q-l described in the above equations.
4 Linear System of Equations
One of the most common uses of matrix inversion is in the solution of a system of linear equations
Mx = b where M is a known square n X n matrix, b is a known column vector of size n, and x
is a column vector of n unknowns. However, a more numerically stable method of solving such a
system is Gaussian Elimination [7J, which takes M and b as input and produces x as output if M
is nonsingular (otherwise it returns a message that M is singular). Therefore we need to consider
the situation where C needs to outsource the solution of the linear system of equations M x = b,
that is, obtain x without having to reveal to A either M or b.
The scheme we describe below satisfies the requirement that all local processing by C take time
proportional to the sIze of the input, in this case O(n 2 ) time.
4.1 Outsourced Linear System Solution
1. C selects a random column vector V of size n and a random nonsingular matrix S of size
nX n.
2. C generates matrix P usIng the same method as for the PI matrix in Steps 1 and 2 of the
preliminary solution to matrix multIplicatIon. That is, P(i, j) = a,-Orr(i),j, where 1l" is a random
permutation, and where the ai are random numbers.







where the matrix multiplication involving S is securely outsourced, and the other operations
are done locally (they take O(n2 ) time).
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4. C outsources to agent A the solution of the linear system illx = b. That is, C sends to A
both ill and b. If M is singular then C gets a message from A saying so, and C can conclude
that M itself is singular. Otherwise C gets back from A the column vector x where
(17)
5. C computes locally
(18)
which is the answer x, because
MP-lj; _ MP-1V





This completes the algorithm.
The security of the above follows from the fact that M is hidden through permutation and
scaling by right-multiplication by p-1 , and left-multiplication by the random matrix S. Also, the
actual solution is hidden with the addition of an additive random component (SMP-lV) to the
right hand side of the system of equations.
4.2 Hiding the Dimension
We only describe how to hide n by embedding the problem M x = b into a larger problem M'x
'
= b'
of size n l > n; shrinking the dimension can be done by using something akin to the equation at the
end of the section on matrix inversion.
Notation 2 In what follows, ifX is an r X c matrix and Y is an r' x c matrix (r < r'), the notation
"Y = X(*, [1: cD" means that Y consists of as many copies of X as needed to jill the r l rows of
Y; the last copy could be partiall if r does not divide r'.
For example, if in the above r l = 2.5r then the notation would mean that Y([1 r], [1 : cD
Y([r + 1 '2r], [1: cD = X, and Y([2r +1, 2.5rJ, [1' cD = X([I' 0.5rJ, [1' cD.
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The larger problem M'x' = b' of size n' > n is defined as follows. The matrix M' and vector
b' are defined as follows, where 0' (respectively, 0") is an n X (n' - n) (respectively, (n' - n) X n)
matrix all of whose entries are zero, S'is an (n' - n) X (n' - n) random invertible matrix, and y is
a random vector of length n' - n:
M'([1 : n], [1: n]) = M,
M'([1 : n], [n + 1 : n']) = 0',
M'([n +1 : n'], [1: n]) = 0",
M'([n + 1 : n'], [n + 1 : n']) ~ S',
b'([1 : n]) = b,
b'([n + 1 : n']) = S'y.
Then the solution x' to the system M'x' = b' is x'([I: n]) = x and x'([n+ I,n'J) = y. Note thaL he
zero entries of 0 ' and all do not betray n because Step 3 of the scheme of the previous subsection
hides these zeroes when it computes if = SMp-l. We can even avoid having 0' and 0" be zeroes
if, in the above, we make
1. 0' a random matrix (rather than a matrix of zeroes),
2.0"=M(*,[I:n]),
3. S' = O'(*,[n+ 1: n']),
4. b'= (b+O'y)(*).
If the random choices made for y and 0' result in a noninvertiblc M', then we repeat until we
get an invertibte M'. Assuming M' is invertible, the solution x' to the system Mix' = b' is still
x'([1 : nl) = x and x'([n +1, n'l) = y, because
Mx + O'y = b'([1 : n]) = b +O'y
and hence M x = b.
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5 Convolution
Assume that C needs to Qutsoufce the computation of the convolution of two vectors M 1 and M 2
of size n each, indexed from 0 to n - 1. The convolution !vI of M1 and M2 is a new vector of size
2n, denoted M = M 1 181 M 2 , such that
M(i) = L M, (k)M2(i - k).
k=O
(19)
Convolution takes O(n2 ) time if done naively, O(nlogn) time if the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT)
is used [1J.
The scheme we describe below satisfies the requirement that all local processing by C take O(n)
time.
5.1 Convolution Scheme
1. C selects two random vectors SI and 52, of size n each (that is, vectors whose entries are
random). C also generates five positive random numbers a, {3. ,. /3','r' such that
If the above is violated then we dlscard the five random numbers chosen and we repeat
the random experiment of choosing a new set of numbers; observe, however, that there is
zero probability that a random choice results in a violation of the above condition, hence
the random choice need not be repeated more than 0(1) times (in practice, once is usually
enough).
2. C computes locally the six vectors aM} +81 , aM2 +S2, f3M} -jS}, f3M2 -j82, f31 M} _j'S},
f3'M2 -j'82 • Then C sends these six vectors, in the above order, to agent A.
3. Agent A uses the six vectors received from C to compute three convolutions, one for each




A then sends W, U, U' to C.
(aM, +5,) 0 (aM2 + 52)
(f3M, - ,5,) 0 (13M2 - ,52)





4. C computes locally the vectors V and V' where
v
v'






Observe that V = a{3M1 ® M 2 + /S1 ® S2, and V' = o:.{3'Mj ® M z + /'S1 ® 3 2 .
5. C computes locally the vector
which happens to equal M 1 ® M z (as is easily verified). This completes the algorithm.
The security of the above scheme is based on the fact that the six vectors received by A do
not enable it to discover M 1 or M z, as A does not know the numbers a, {3, /, {3', /' and the vectors
31 ,S2·
5.2 Hiding the Dimension
Hiding the dimension by expanding the problem size is straightfowrad by "padding" the two input
vectors with zeroes (the details are easy and are omltted). The zeroes do not betray the value of
n because Step 2 hides these zeroes by adding random numbers to them.
Hidlng the dimension by shrinking the problem size is done in two steps: (i) Replacing the
convolution of size n by three convolutions of size nJ2 each, and then (H) recursively hiding (by
shrinking or by expandlng) the sizes of these three convolutions. IT suffices for the depth of the
recursion in (ii) to be 0(1). That (i) is possible is seen as follows. For an n-vector M, let M(wcn)
(respectively, M(odd) denote the (n/2)-vector consisting of the even (respectively, odd) numbered
entries of M. It is easy to verify that
where 3hift(x) shifts the vector x by one position. This implies that the following three convolu-
tions, involving vectors of size nj2 each, are enough to obtain M 1 ® M 2 :
1. (M1even) + M1odd)) 0 (MJ"ven) + MJ"dd»)
2. (M1even ) _ M1"dd») ® (MJ"ven) _ MJodd))
18
Adding and subtracting the results of the above convolutions (1) and (2) enables us to obtain
M (even) ® M(odd) + M(odd) ® M(even) d M(cven) ® M(evcn) + M(odd) ® M(odd). Th I .I 2 1 2 an 1 2 1 2· e OfillCCIS
recognized as (M} ® M 2)(oddl, and the latter allows us to obtain (in conjunction with the result of
convolution (3)) (M} 0 M2 )(clIcn).
6 Sorting
Asssume that C needs to Qutsource the sorting of a sequence of numbers E = {el' .. " en} with the
ei taken from a set equipped with a total ordering relationship (without loss of generality let us
assume that the ei are real: ej E R, i = 1, .. -, n). E is not to be revealed to the outsourcing agent.
TIllS can be done a.s follows.
C selects a strictly increasing function f : E 1--+ R, such as
J(e;)="+iJ(e;+,)' (25)
where 0:, {3, I are known to C but not to A. In fact, even the nature of f could be hidden from A
if C selects the function f from a large catalog of functions; the rest of this section assumes the
above quadratic form for f. Observe that for the above f to be stricly increasing, '1 must be chosen
such ei + '1 ~ 0 for all i.
The scheme we describe below satisfies the requirement that all local processing by C take O(n)
time.
1. C chooses fl, fJ, and '1 locally, thus defining the function f (as explained above).
2. C chooses locally a random sorted sequence A = (>'1, ... , AI) of 1 numbers. This is done by
randomely "walking" on the real line from MIN to MAX where MIN is smaller than the
smallest number being sorted and MAX is larger than the largest number being sorted. This
random "walking" is implemented as follows. Let .6. = (MAX - M I N)/n. C generates the
sorted sequence A as follows:
(a) Randomely generate Al from a uniform distribution in [MIN, MIN + 2.6.].
(b) Randomely generate A2 from a uniform distribution [AI,.Al +2.6.].
(c) Continue in the same way until you go past MAX, at which time you stop. The total
number of elements generated is 1for some integer 1.
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Observe that A is sorted by construction, that each random increment has expected value 6.,
and that the expected value of I is (MAX - M I N)j f::!. ::::: n.







where f(E) is the sequence obtained from E by replacing every element €i of E by f(ei).




u N. Then C generates a
randomly permuted version (call it W) of E
'
u A'.
5. C sends W to agent A, who sorts It and sends back a sorted version of W, call it W'.
G. C receives W' and removes from it the sequence N. C can do this in O(n) time because W'
and the saved copy of A' are already sorted. This produces a sequence E, which is a sorted
version of E' ::::: f(E).
7. C computes l-l(.E), which is equal to a sorted version of E. This completes the algorithm.
The above scheme reveals n because the number of items we send to A for sorting has expected
value 2n. To change this from 2n to m +n where m is unrelated to n, we would have to modify
Step 2 so that IJ. ::::: (MAX - MIN)jm where m differs from n (hence the expected value of I
in Step 2 becomes m). This hides problem size by expanding it. Hiding it by shrinking is done
by partitioning the problem into a constant (small) number of problems, each of which is then
recursivey sorted, i.e., by outsourcing with size-hiding (using shrinking or expansion). The sorted
pieces are then merged locally by C, in linear time.
7 Experimental Results and Practical Observations
The purpose of the experimental work is not only to have "proof of concept" software, but also to
shed some light on the numerical properties of the schemes proposed, namely, the difference between
the answer we obtain and the answer that would have been obtained if all of the computations had
been done locally (l.e., without using our outsourcing schemes). If computers had infinite precision
(or if we use sophisticated software that simulates such precision) then the difference is, of course,
zero. We report a series of experimental results for the secure outsourcing algorithms presented in
the previous sections. The algorithms have been implemented in ANSI C++, compiled with the GNU
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g++ compiler and executed in double precision on a. SUN SpaxcStation 20 running the Solaris
5.4 operating system. In the results that aTe reported the following metrics arc used.
Vector Metrics For a vector V of size n we use the following norms
• IIVIII = 2:7~11V(i)1
• IIVII> = J2:7~11V(i)12
For two vectors of size n, V and V we use the following errors
• Absolute Error:. Eabs = IIV - Vlj
• Relative Errol. Erel = It~lI"
where the norms involved can be any of the three norms defined above.
Matrix Metrics For a matrix M of size m x n we use the following norms
• IIMIIF = J'L.-~t 'L.-fo:tIM(i,j)12, where F stands for the Frobenius norm,
For two matrices of size m X n, M and M we use the following errors
• Absolute Error:. Eabll = 11M - Mil
• Relative Errol. Ercl = ItM){"
• Maximum Absolute Errol. Ema :!: = maxt:O:;(i,i):::(m,n) IM(i1j) - M(i,j)1
where the norms involved can be any of the three norms defined above.
General Metrics For a sequence of length]( of pairs of matrices {(Mj,Mi),i = 11 ,. ',K}, or
vectors {(Vi, v,.), i = 1,'·', K}, we define the average absolute error as
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The average Ema:z: is defined similarly. The root-mean-square error (RMS) is defined, for any of the
three norms, as
1 K _
J( ~)IIM; - Mdl)', or,
.=1
1 K _
f( 2:) IlVi - Vdl)',
.=1
The experimental results reported are based on a sequence of trial inputs that were randomly
generated. The averages are taken over these sequences of inputs. The error results that are
reported are based on the value obtained through secure outsourcing and the value that is computed
by the normal local implementation of the relevant algorithm. The number of trials for convolution
was 1,000, while for the other three algorithms the number of trials was 100 because of the enormous
size of the computations. Indicative numbers are reported for three different sizes of the input. For
convolution, we give the error on vectors of size 10, 100, and 1,000. For matrix multiplication we
report results for products of square matrices 10 x 10, 50 X 50, and 100 x 100. The results for the
solution of linear systems of equations are for 10, 50, and 100 unknowns. Finally the results for
matrix inversion are for matrix sizes of 10 X 10, 50 X 50, and 100 x 100. The actual entries of the
matrices and vectors in the above experiments were typically two to three digits long, i.e., between
10 and 1,000, generated randomly.
The RMS for all the algorithms is reported in all three norms while the relative, absolute and
maximum are reported only for the infinity norm. Observe that Eabs == Cma:z: for vectors using the
infinity norm, so that for the solution of linear systems and the convolution we only report the Eabs
in norm infinity.
Speaking in general terms, the absolute error in norm infinity is an indication of the number of
decimal digits that are correct. For example, an error of lO-p would imply that at least p decimal
digits are correct.
We observe that in all four algorithms, the error is very small but tends to increase as we scale
the size of the input. This is expected as the accumulation of round-off errors becomes larger
for larger inputs. Let us mention that our implementation has adopted no special techniques for
error control or higher accuracy. We have implemented the outsourcing algorithms described in a
straightforward manner, using LU decomposition with implicit partial pivoting for matrix inversion
and linear system solution and plain computer algebra for convolution and matrix multiplication.
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In this sense, the results reported here should he considered as an upper bound on the error -
smaller errors would result if we had used sophisticated numerical methods for error control.
(~ RMS 11-11,1 RMS II-IIF I RMS II-II I '. II-II 1" II-II, , , 00 " 00 '" 00 m.'Slze: 10 x 10 2.115e 10 9.947e 11 l.667e 10 2.26Be 10 2.56ge 16 6.tl46e 11
size: 50 X 50 l.342e 08 l.997e 09 4.231e 09 5.322e - DB 2.643e - 15 4.381e - 09
size: 100 x 100 1.853e - 07 1.16ge - 08 1.982e - 08 3.07ge - 06 4.025e - 14 1.48ge - 07
~ 100 trials
Table 1: Error metrics for secure matrix multiplication
, , , , 00
." 00 " , 00
SIze: 10 9.797e - 08 2.476e - 08 1.726e - 08 2.055e - 08 2.622e - 16
SIze: 100 l.OBBe 05 7.853e 07 3.078e 07 5.680e 07 8.17Be 16
sIze: 1000 l.652e 03 3.465e 05 8.62ge 06 2.276c 05 3.49le 15
~ 1 000 t,ia!, ~ RMS II-Ih IRMS II-II, IRMS II-II I,. II-II I, I II-II ~
Table 2: Error metrks for secure convolutIon




Slze: 10 4.512e 10 1.627e 10 8.273e 11 2.053e 11 3.248e 12
size: 50 3.445e 07 5.812e 08 2.007e 08 9.463e 09 2.l00e 09
size: 100 1.59ge - 04 1.97ge - 05 5.008e - 06 1.742e-06 2.097e - 07
~ 100 trial, ~ RMS II-Ih IRMS II-II, I RMS II-II I,. II-II I ( I II-II ~
Table 3: Error metrics for secure solution of linear systems
8 Further Remarks
All of the schemes described in this paper assume the use of a single external agent. If more than
one agent is available, then by randomly choosing from the available pool of agents we can afford
to do less data hiding. This was pointed out earlier in the context of one particular scheme, hut
all of our schemes could be simplified if they were allowed to make use of more than one agent.
(Intuition makes one expect a tradeoff between the number of available agents and the amount
of hiding needed.) Future research in this area may well encounter problems [or which secure
outsourcing can be achieved only by using more than one external agent.
A multi-agent envIronment raises many interesting questions, including:
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,~ RMS 11'liI IRMS II'IIF IRMS 11'11 I q 11'11 1,,11'11, , , 00 o " 00 '"' 00 mo.
Slze: 10 X 10 2.725e 13 7.504e 13 1.l72e 12 2.652e 13 1.048e 13 7.292e 14
size: 50 X 50 3.810e - 08 1.821e - 08 3.142e - 08 7.927e - 08 9.248e - 09 1.028e - 08
size: 100 X 100 1.697e - 06 5.857e - 07 1.467e - 06 1.731e - 05 2.692e - 06 1.205e - 06
~ 100 trials
Table 4: Error metrles for secure matrix inversion
• Whether it is reasonable to assume that mutiple external agents will not conspire with each
other against the customer, by sharing with each other the data that the customer sends
them.
• If external agents are conspiring against the customer, how they can overcome the problem of
"matching" the relevant subcomputations outsourced by the customer to each of them (from
among the potentially huge number of computations outsourced to them by the customer).
The customer can make this task difficult by
deliberately interleaving the temporal ordering of the jobs outsourced to achieve betler
security, and
deliberately outsourcing "fake" computations.
The above two obfuscation techniques make sense even in a single-agent environment.
• How one goes about proving that the secure outsourcing of a particular problem inherently
requires at least k external (non-conspiring) agents, k > 1.
We also note that the scheme proposed in this paper solves an interesting problem related to the
distributed scheduling system described by Chapin and Spafford in [3]. The work described there
provided an architecture to distribute large computations without disclosing information about the
machines doing the computation, and without sacrificing control of those machines. The drawback
to that scheme was that the users did not have a means of hiding their data and computation from
the machine owners. The method described here addresses that concern, and enables outsourcing
to take place in an environment that is not completely defined.
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